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ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCB Asset-backed comercial paper
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDOs Collateralised debt obligations
CDS Credit Default Swap
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs Deposit institutions
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial vehicle corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IAS International Accounting Standards
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LBOs Leveraged buy-out operations
LGD Loss given default
m Millions
MEFF Mercado Español de Futuros y Opciones (Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price earnings ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIVs Structured investment vehicles
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
* The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of the 
 Financial Stability Report.
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Overview
The deepening of the financial turbulence that began last summer coupled with gloomier glo-
bal growth prospects make for a more complex scenario for Spanish and foreign financial in-
stitutions alike. However, and as highlighted throughout this Financial Stability Report (FSR), 
the position of Spanish deposit institutions as at December 2007 means it may be said that 
they are facing this period of greater uncertainty from a sound position. Further, Spanish banks 
have avoided complex products whose valuation has proven highly problematic, they have not 
held off-balance sheet positions through specific vehicles (conduits and SIVs), they maintain 
very limited risks in leveraged buy-out operations (LBOs) and they have no exposure to mono-
lines. That said, the property market slowdown poses certain additional challenges for Span-
ish banks.
Since the publication of the last FSR, the international financial turbulence has intensified, af-
fecting various markets and institutions. In addition to tensions in the money markets, which 
continue, the credit and financing markets have seen their difficulties increase. There have 
been substantial reductions and strong oscillations in stock market prices, though the func-
tioning of this market has not been subject to significant distortions, unlike the credit markets. 
These developments have had a very adverse impact on certain international banks with a 
strong presence in the investment banking business and on other financial market participants 
(monolines and hedge funds).
Growth forecasts for the world economy have been gradually revised downwards as the finan-
cial turbulence has heightened. Along with the factors of risk stemming from financial markets, 
uncertainty persists over the scale of the slowdown in the US economy and in relation to the 
correction of global imbalances and to the inflation outlook. Although the downside risks are 
marked, the developed economies can draw on significant factors of resilience in the current 
circumstances, such as the soundness of the business sector and greater economic flexibili-
ty.
Foreign financial assets are highly diversified, while their risk profile is very low. Accordingly, the 
challenges for Spanish banks stem largely from financing to households and firms in Spain, 
and also from the difficulties international financial markets are undergoing.
Credit extended by Spanish deposit institutions grew at a notable rate in 2007, though it has 
held on the slowing trend observed in previous FSRs. This slowdown is largely related to a 
reduction in the pace of credit to activities linked to the real estate sector, both in housing and 
property development, in step with the ongoing adjustment in this sector in Spain. A strategy 
of greater diversification of credit portfolios would appear to be under way, at the same time 
that financing granted to companies not in the construction and property development sectors 
is increasing.
Doubtful assets grew during 2007. The increase, due in part to the rise in interest rates, 
should be viewed having regard to several factors. First, it is a natural consequence of the 
strong growth of credit in previous years, given the time lag between when a loan is granted 
and when default problems emerge. Further, the starting levels of doubtful assets are very 
low, which logically affects the attendant rates of change. Also, the levels of provisioning for 
doubtful assets are very high, all the more so when the comparison is at the international 
level.
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Doubtful assets ratios, despite rising slightly in 2007, are at low levels. They are likely to con-
tinue rising during the current year, owing both to the growth of doubtful assets and to the 
slowdown in credit. The data on financing granted in recent years, in terms of both mortgage 
and corporate loans, indicate that the deterioration in bad debts is not due to banks having 
pursued excessively lax lending policies. Moreover, these data also confirm that the situation 
in Spain is not comparable to that in the United States. This is so not only in respect of the 
sub-prime segment, which does not exist in Spain, but also when Spanish mortgages are 
compared with their highest-quality US counterparts. These differences have held over time, 
i.e. they are structural and are not in response to the cyclical position of the housing market in 
both countries.
Doubtful assets ratios in the real estate development segment, which have risen slightly, re-
main at very low levels. However, there are certain factors that make a detailed analysis of this 
sector worthwhile: the strong growth of credit to real estate development companies in previ-
ous years and the developments in the Spanish property sector, which is immersed in a proc-
ess of adjustment. To assess the impact of a more-pronounced-than-expected deterioration 
in the sector’s credit quality, several stress tests have been performed under very severe as-
sumptions. Spanish deposit institutions, thanks to their provisioning level, are in a position to 
withstand very significant increases in defaults on credit to property developers.
Spanish banks will be affected by the general conditions in international financial markets, 
which at present have witnessed a notable contraction in liquidity. The Spanish banking sys-
tem is not immune to this situation, though its liquidity levels have proven sufficient. Part of the 
explanation is due to the appropriate financing structure Spanish banks have maintained in 
recent years, with very long-dated financing accounting for a significant weight, despite the 
higher cost entailed. In Spain, the predominant banking model is a retail one, which gives 
banks greater room for manoeuvre to step up the raising of deposits.
Spanish banks have financed some of the growth in their activity through the wholesale 
markets, pursuing a policy of active diversification of their sources of financing. One widely 
used means has been asset securitisation which, in Spain’s case, evidences significant 
particularities. Thus, banks have not used securitisation as a risk-transfer mechanism, and 
nor have they developed the types of structures and complex products present in other 
banking systems. And reinforcing this is the high quality of the portfolios that have been 
securitised.
Currently, the higher cost of financing through securitisations and the withdrawal from the 
market of a good number of investors in these products have led banks to continue securitis-
ing, in order to retain bonds and thus, on a precautionary basis, have collateral with which to 
obtain — if necessary — liquidity from the Eurosystem or from other financial intermediaries 
(i.e. secured lending). Net Eurosystem loans represent a very low weight in Spanish banks’ 
total balance sheet (1.3%), continuing to stand below Spain’s relative weight in the Eurosys-
tem. Conversely, other countries’ banks obtain funds above their relative weight, without that 
denoting any problem either for these banks or for the Eurosystem as a whole. It should be 
clarified that these operations are part of the habitual framework in which the Eurosystem im-
plements its monetary policy.
Also, in present international financial market conditions, Spanish banks have been resorting 
to a greater extent to short-term financing in the wholesale markets. This means that there is 
a need for appropriate liquidity management, and for a resumption of financing at longer ma-
turities, despite the higher cost, once market conditions return to normal.
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Spanish banks are in a good starting position on the basis of an analysis of their profitability 
and solvency. From the standpoint of profitability, their results in 2007, unlike those for other 
international banks, were not affected by the sub-prime crisis. Accordingly, the notable growth 
in earnings was underpinned by the sound performance of the main operating margins, and 
by improved efficiency.
Solvency remains well above the regulatory minimum levels, while Spanish banks’ capital and 
reserves as a proportion of assets stand above that of most of the major banks in other devel-
oped countries. What is more, the soundness of Spanish banks is manifest in the stress tests 
conducted which, despite considering adverse macroeconomic scenarios, continue to show 
their notable resilience.
The financial turbulence is not only complicating the banking industry’s operating environment; 
other market participants (insurance companies, and pension and investment funds) are also 
facing a more complex setting. In Spain, however, the exposure of these intermediaries to the 
sub-prime segment is also very marginal.
To date, the turbulence has affected financial markets, but not the infrastructures underpinning 
them. Nonetheless, supervisors and regulators continue working to bolster their correct func-
tioning, and to adjust and improve the regulations bearing on market participants.
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1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Since the last FSR the international financial environment has been marked by the persistence 
and deepening of the turbulence that began in the summer of 2007. Tensions have heightened 
in the credit markets and in the short-term financing markets linked to securitised assets 
(ABCP), and they persist in money markets. They have also passed through to new segments 
(hedge funds) and other leveraged structures.1 Certain banks exposed to structured products 
linked to the transmission of credit risk have posted heavy losses which, on occasions, have 
required capital increases, largely financed by the sovereign funds of emerging economies. 
The turbulence has also strongly impacted other financial agents, such as bond insurance 
agencies (monolines). These risk seeing their credit rating downgraded and, were this to come 
about, that would be an additional setback for the trading of the financial products that they 
insure. All these developments have come about in a less buoyant world economy, the result 
in part of tighter financing conditions and of a downward revision practically across the board 
of growth expectations, which in turn makes resolving the turbulence in the financial system 
more difficult.
The factors at the root of the financial turbulence have worsened. In the United States, sub-
prime mortgage loan default rates have increased significantly and the housing market contin-
ues to adjust, both in terms of activity and of prices. Moreover, the lack of trust in structured 
products has been exacerbated in part by the valuation problems affecting these instruments 
of complex design and scant transparency.
Risk indices in the credit markets have increased strongly, marking their peak since the start of 
the turbulence, and corporate bond spreads have also risen, particularly in the financial sector. 
Furthermore, the persistence of the turbulence has meant that, since early 2008, tensions 
have been visible in both the low-grade and high-grade segments (see Chart 1.1.A). 
Tensions in interbank markets have not abated as a lack of trust persists among banks, entail-
ing a high counterparty risk premium (see Chart 1.1.B). The main central banks have reacted 
to these tensions since they emerged in August 2007 by taking numerous measures, including 
most notably a more active management of liquidity in interbank markets and an increase in 
the proportion of funds supplied in long-term refinancing operations. Moreover, certain central 
banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, expanded the range of collat-
eral acceptable for liquidity operations and broadened the number of eligible counterparties. 
There has also been notable international cooperation among the main central banks which 
took the form of the setting up of currency swap lines between the Federal Reserve, the ECB 
and the Bank of Switzerland. In March, faced with worsening liquidity tensions, the main cen-
tral banks announced further measures. In the case of the Federal Reserve, this involved set-
ting up a new instrument — a term securities lending facility — through which it will increase 
the volume, duration and collateral admitted for liquidity provision. An expansion in the volume 
of the aforementioned swaps facilities was also announced.
The impact of the turbulence on other financial markets has been considerable. A flight to 
quality has been witnessed which, among other aspects, has contributed to reducing short- 
and medium-term interest rates on public debt securities. The repercussions have spread to 
new segments which had hitherto shown some resilience, such as stock markets and US 
International financial 
turbulence persists and is 
worsening against the 
background of a less 
dynamic world economy.
The factors at the root of 
the turbulence have 
worsened.
Central banks are reacting 
to ease money market 
tensions.
The tensions have spread to 
other markets.
1. Box 1.1 gives a brief explanation of these and other terms.
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Sub-prime mortgage US high-risk mortgages granted to households characterised by a credit record of defaults,
as well as low or nil capacity to finance a part of the purchase of the house and low (and unstable) 
income in relation to the amount of debt assumed.
Conduits and special investment
vehicles (SIVs)
Institutions whose activity is based on raising funds through issuance of short-term commercial 
paper (ABCP) and investing in long-term assets (asset-backed bonds, CDOs, etc.). Unlike SIVs, 
conduits usually have liquidity lines with the banks that sponsor them.These special-purpose 
entities were pursuing an activity very similar to that of banks (short-term funding and long-term 
investment) without having the required capital, access to central bank liquidity or suitable 
supervision.
Leveraged buy-out (LBO) Corporate acquisition operations carried out through external financing in which the indebtedness 
of the acquired company is raised substantially. These activities fall within private equity operations, 
in which a group of investors buys a company with the aim of restructuring it, making it more 
profitable and later selling it.
Pipeline risk Possibility that once the originator of a certain operation (for example, of an LBO) has assumed
the related debt, it cannot syndicate it or place it with other investors, due to changes in market 
conditions.
Asset-backed securities (ABS) Bonds arising in the process of asset securitisation. When mortgage loans are securitised,
the bonds are called RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities).
Asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP)
Securitisations funded through the issuance of short-term commercial paper. As there is a high and 
continuous volume of commercial paper issuances and redemptions, the liquidity risk is very high.
Collateralised debt obligations
(CDO)
Securitisation structure in which the portfolio has little granularity and, moreover, the assets that 
compose it are heterogeneous. Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), in which loans are 
securitised (corporate finance, LBO, etc.) are distinguished from collateralised bond obligations 
(CBOs), when corporate or high-risk (high-yield or junk) bonds, among others, are securitised.
CDO of ABS CDO in which bonds coming from other securitisations (ABS) are incorporated into the securitised 
portfolio.
CDO squared CDO in which other CDOs are incorporated into the securitised portfolio.
Synthetic securitisation Financial structure through which credit risk is transferred, using for such purpose a credit 
derivative (typically a CDS).
Credit default swap (CDS) Credit derivative in which the seller of protection, in exchange for a premium, undertakes to make 
payment to the buyer of protection if a certain credit event occurs (for example, the default
on a bond, or a change in its credit rating).
Monolines Insurance companies authorised to offer credit enhancements in certain bond issues. They initiated 
their activity in the area of US municipal bonds, but in the last few years they have increasingly 
turned to insuring asset-backed bonds, CDOs, etc. Their success depends on having a high credit 
rating.
Derivative product companies
(DPCs)
Companies that sell protection against credit risk using derivatives (typically CDSs). In some ways 
they are similar to monolines, although they assume the risk through derivatives and not through an 
insurance policy.
BOX 1.1VOCABULARY REFERRING TO PRODUCTS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE PRESENT 
SITUATION IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
municipal bonds, in this latter case as a result of the difficulties facing monolines. As from 
January 2008, there were strong oscillations in stock prices and significant losses, largely as a 
result of the (downward) revision of growth expectations and of the greater risks associated 
with maintaining the pace of activity. The emerging markets were also affected, in terms both 
of stock markets and of debt, although sovereign debt spreads remain relatively contained and 
have reacted with notable vigour in the periods in which improvements have been recorded in 
the developed markets.
The Federal Reserve continued with the gradual cuts to official interest rates it initiated in Au-
gust 2007, which quickened as US growth prospects worsened. In January 2008 it twice cut 
The Federal Reserve is 
cutting interest rates. The
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interest rates for a total of 125 bp, with a further 75 bp shaved off in March. The federal funds 
target rate has thus fallen to 2.25%, compared with 5.25% in July 2007. That has contributed 
to a notable and generalised depreciation of the dollar, to an all-time low against the euro, and 
to a greater slope in the debt yield curve, insofar as the decline in long-term interest rates has 
been appreciably less than that in short rates. The Bank of England also cut its official rate by 
a further 25 bp to 5.25%.
World growth forecasts have been progressively revised downwards as financial turbulence 
has become more accentuated (see Charts 1.2.A and 1.2.B), although the central scenario of 
most analysts incorporates only partially the deterioration in global financial conditions, ruling 
out the possibility of a severe, protracted and widespread credit squeeze, which is the biggest 
risk facing the global economy. Taking a consensus view of forecasts, the slowdown is ex-
pected to be more marked in the developed economies, in particular in the United States, 
while the emerging economies may be expected to sustain relatively high rates of activity, 
which is a favourable factor in a particularly complicated global picture. Likewise, the financial 
soundness of companies in the real sector and the greater flexibility of economies are favour-
able factors of some weight in the current circumstances. In any event, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the persistence of the financial turbulence and its impact on the real economy means 
that the downside risks are marked. In the euro area, provisional Eurostat data show that in 
2007 Q4 the pace of GDP slowed to a year-on-year rate of 2.3%, 0.4 pp less than in Q3 (see 
Chart 1.3.A). The latest ECB macroeconomic projections indicate that the growth rate of GDP 
in the euro area will continue to fall, standing for the year as a whole at between 1.3% and 
2.1%.
Another major risk, which stems in part from the financial turbulence and which might interact 
with it, is the possibility of the decline in US economic activity spreading to economies in the 
rest of the world, and of an abrupt and disorderly correction of global imbalances. Adding to 
this factor of uncertainty are oil prices (at an all-time high) and commodity prices, and the in-
creases in food prices, insofar as they might adversely affect inflation. Indeed, the inflationary 
pressures observed in the second half of the year, and the possibility that these may take root 
in expectations about prices in the medium term, pose another significant risk as they con-
strain the monetary policy room for manoeuvre.
dollar is depreciating and 
the slope of the yield curve 
is increasing.
World growth forecasts 
have been revised 
progressively downwards, 
especially in the United 
States.
There are downside risks to 
world economic growth. 
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In the case of the Spanish economy, and despite the less favourable external macroeconomic 
setting and the financial turbulence, GDP maintained a dynamic pace during the second half 
of 2007, although it continued on the moderately slowing trend observed throughout the year. 
In Q4 GDP posted a year-on-year growth rate of 3.5%, 0.3 pp down on the previous quarter 
and 1.2 pp above the euro area figure (see Chart 1.3.A).
Spanish GDP developments during the second half of 2007 were the outcome, in terms of its 
components, of a reduction in the expansion of domestic demand, in respect of both con-
sumption and gross fixed capital formation, which was not fully offset by the improvement in 
the negative net contribution of the external sector (see Chart 1.3.B). The growth rate of em-
Despite the less favourable 
setting, the Spanish economy 
continued to grow at a high 
— though slowing — rate.
GDP was more balanced, 
which was accompanied by 
less dynamism in job 
creation.
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ployment averaged 3% for the year, although in the final quarter there was a slight rise in the 
unemployment rate, which ended 2007 at 8.6%.
The financial turbulence has made for a moderate tightening of loan concession criteria, but 
so far it has not entailed a significant increase in corporate and household financing costs, 
beyond that derived from the rise in interbank interest rates. In any event, the latter returns 
have fallen in 2008 to date.
Against this background, the rate of increase of household and corporate debt ratios has 
continued easing in recent months. The ongoing and gradual moderation in prices has contin-
ued in the housing market, with their year-on-year growth rate standing at 4.8% in December 
2007, over 4 pp less than at end-2006.
In sum, the Spanish economy ended 2007 with a robust expansion of GDP, albeit on a gradu-
ally slowing course. The macroeconomic projections of the Banco de España suggest that 
economic dynamism will be maintained in the coming quarters, though the slowdown in activ-
ity will be more pronounced. In any event, these projections are subject to considerably great-
er uncertainty than in the past due to the difficulties of anticipating the scale of certain phe-
nomena such as, in particular, the impact of the financial turbulence.2
Private-sector financing 
conditions have tightened 
moderately…
… contributing to lessening 
the rate of increase of 
indebtedness, while house 
prices have continued to 
slow gradually.
The macroeconomic 
projections of the Banco de 
España point to a 
somewhat more marked 
slowdown in GDP in the 
coming quarters. 
2. For more details see “Spanish economic projections report”, Economic Bulletin, April 2008, Banco de España.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
The consolidated balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions (Table 2.1) show a high rate 
of activity in 2007, with assets growing by 14.7%. Business in Spain, despite posting a slight 
slowdown in assets compared with 2006 (1.7 pp), is growing more sharply than business 
abroad (15.8% in Spain, against 10.7% abroad).
The growth of total assets is largely attributable to the rise in financing to the private sector 
(credit and fixed income), which increased by 16% in 2007. However, lending to the private 
sector, moving on a trend already observed in the previous FSR, slowed in relation to 2006, 
falling from growth of around 25% to 16%. This deceleration is centred on business in Spain, 
especially in secured lending.
Doubtful assets are growing more sharply than in 2006 (44.6%), both in business in 
Spain and in total business. The higher growth of doubtful assets is largely due to the 
strong increase in credit in past years, and to the course of interest rates in the euro 
area. Nonetheless, the rate of change of doubtful assets should be assessed taking into 
account their low starting levels, which translates into a doubtful assets ratio1 for total 
business at the consolidated level of 0.78%, only 17 bp higher than that recorded in 
2006. In any event, the provisions for bad debts amply cover the volume of doubtful as-
sets.
The slowdown in credit referred to was partly offset by the growth of fixed income, 
which had declined in 2006 in absolute terms. Investments contributed to the increase 
in total assets, and their notable growth, relating to the acquisitions by certain banks 
during 2007, translated into an increase in their weight in bank balance sheets (to 
1.6%). 
Finally, among the most expansionary items on the assets side is that of central banks. 
From the standpoint of liabilities, too, this heading posts a notable increase, reflecting the 
resort by Spanish banks to Eurosystem liquidity. The turbulence in financial markets has 
led to a change in the distribution of liquidity in the Eurosystem as a whole by country and 
by bank. Thus, Spanish banks have increased the liquidity they receive from the Eurosys-
tem, raising net lending (the difference between the funds received in liquidity providing 
operations and those delivered in absorbing operations) as of December 2007 to €44,038 
million which, nonetheless, accounts for a very small proportion of the total balance sheet 
(only 1.3% in December 2007). What is more, and as is analysed in detail in this FSR, the 
relative weight of the liquidity obtained from the Eurosystem by Spanish banks is, unlike in 
other countries, still below the relative weight of Spain’s GDP in the Eurosystem’s overall 
GDP.
Also as a result of the financial turbulence, financing via negotiable securities has also grown 
less sharply than in 2006. The related growth rate stands, nonetheless, at 19.6%, reflecting 
the fact that Spanish banks have continued issuing securities. Subordinated financing grew by 
13.5%, a similar increase to that posted the previous year (14.5%). 
2.1 Deposit institutions 
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS
The pace of activity in 2007 
is high, though slowing.
Doubtful assets are growing 
sharply, but doubtful assets 
ratios remain at very low 
levels and coverage is high.
Banks have increased their 
financing from the 
Eurosystem, but the weight 
in the balance sheet is very 
low…
1. In the FSR the concept of default is used as a synonym for doubtful assets, although technically, doubtful assets in-
clude other assets besides those in default.
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For the first time in recent years, the weight in the balance sheet of private-sector deposits has 
held virtually unchanged in relation to the previous year (44.3%), as they grew at a rate of 13%, 
similar to that in 2006. The business model pursued by Spanish banks, based on retail opera-
tions, with an extensive network of offices, close contact with customers and a high managed 
percentage of investment funds, makes it conceivable that, if the turbulence persists, banks 
will have the capacity to obtain more financing via deposits. This, combined with the slow-
down in the demand for credit, will contribute to alleviating the need for financing on the 
wholesale markets while the current conditions in these markets remain in place.
… while deposits as a 
proportion of total assets 
have stabilised, following 
the reductions in previous 
years.
ASSETS DEC-07
(CHANGE)
DEC-07/
DEC-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 88,587 80.0 1.7 2.7
Loans and advances to credit institutions 249,345 2.0 8.5 7.5
General government 49,806 -1.4 1.7 1.5
Other private sectors 2,210,957 15.5 66.2 66.7
Debt securities 355,643 9.1 11.3 10.7
Other equity instruments 105,497 2.4 3.6 3.2
Investments 54,388 96.0 1.0 1.6
Derivatives 92,079 27.0 2.5 2.8
Tangible assets 35,984 -1.1 1.3 1.1
Other (a) 73,834 7.7 2.4 2.2
TOTAL ASSETS 3,316,120 14.7 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,323,964 16.0 69.2 70.1
Financing to general government 204,298 0.4 7.0 6.2
Total doubtful assets 22,241 44.6 0.5 0.7
Total doubtful assets ratio 0.78 17.0 (c) — —
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 42,029 17.6 1.2 1.3
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY DEC-07
(CHANGE)
DEC-07/
DEC-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-06
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
DEC-07
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 91,973 111.9 1.5 2.8
Deposits from credit institutions 468,087 6.1 15.3 14.1
General government 89,432 15.3 2.7 2.7
Other private sectors 1,468,944 13.0 44.9 44.3
Marketable debt securities 659,235 19.6 19.1 19.9
Derivatives 105,909 33.8 2.7 3.2
Subordinated debt 80,645 13.5 2.5 2.4
Provisions 33,679 -8.6 1.3 1.0
Other (a) 109,895 -7.0 4.1 3.3
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,107,799 14.3 94.0 93.7
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Eurosystem net lending (b) 44,086 108.1 1.3 0.7
Minority interests 10,860 92.6 0.2 0.3
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity 16,940 -24.6 0.8 0.5
Own funds 180,522 23.7 5.0 5.4
TOTAL EQUITY 208,322 19.7 6.0 6.3
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,316,124 14.7 100 100
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including 
valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b.  Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds 
delivered in absorbing operations.
c. Difference calculated in bp.
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During 2007, Spanish deposit institutions increased their own funds for accounting purposes 
(at a rate of 23.7%) more sharply than in 2006, thereby raising their relative weight in the bal-
ance sheet (from 5% to 5.4%).
The sharper growth of business in Spain compared with that pursued abroad means that the 
relative weight of the latter has declined slightly to 21% of total assets. Over the course of re-
cent years Spanish banks have diversified their activity abroad, lessening their exposure in 
emerging countries, in particular in Latin America, in order to increase their presence in Eu-
rope, and more recently in the United States (see Chart 2.1.A). The risk profile of assets abroad 
remains very low (see Chart 2.1.B). 
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain continued slowing in the second half of 2007 
(from 22.6% in June to 16.6% in December; see Chart 2.2.A), a situation already observable 
in the first half of the year (25.8% in December 2006). The slowdown has thus come about 
gradually, which highlights the fact that it is a process of progressive adjustment towards a less 
expansionary situation than that experienced in recent years, when very high credit growth 
rates were recorded. Nonetheless, the figures for December 2007 show credit to be growing 
at an appreciable pace.
The lower growth rate of credit is concentrated particularly in that extended with a mortgage 
guarantee (from 25% in December 2006 to 15% in the same month in 2007). The foregoing is 
reflected in a reduction in the contribution to total credit growth of activities related to the real 
estate sector (see Chart 2.2.B).
Confirming the trends dating back to end-2006, financing to households intended for 
house purchases has slowed (from 22.5% December 2006 to 13.4% in December 2007), 
but so too, and on a similar scale, has consumer credit (durable and current alike). In the 
corporate sector, credit for construction and real estate development, unlike financing ex-
No significant risks are 
discernible in foreign 
financial assets.
The slowdown in credit is 
the result of a process of 
gradual adjustment…
… concentrated particularly 
in mortgage credit.
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CHART 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Weighted average of default probabilities. An explanation of the calculation of the
risk profile of assets abroad can be found in Estabilidad Financiera , No. 7, November 2007.
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tended to the other sectors, has slowed notably (from 43.9% in December 2006 to 20.9% 
12 months later). The decoupling existing in previous years between the growth rate of fi-
nancing for house purchases and credit to the business real estate sector is thus tending 
to be corrected.
The slowdown in real estate-related activities in the broadest sense is consistent with develop-
ments in the property market. Likewise, it shows the new diversification strategy that Spanish 
banks are pursuing, which translates into a progressive, though still incipient, loss of relative 
weight of construction and real estate development in the overall financing granted to the busi-
ness sector (see Chart 2.2.C). Thus, for business activities other than construction and devel-
opment, the financing extended has quickened (from 18.5% in December 2006 to 20.3% in 
December 2007), with the year-on-year rate of change holding virtually stable from June to 
December 2007. 
The lower growth of real 
estate activities is in 
response to the change of 
pattern in the Spanish 
economy and to a new 
diversification strategy by 
banks.
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In previous years, a portion of the growth of credit to the corporate sector came about due to 
large-scale financing operations relating to corporate moves in different industries, included 
among which are LBOs.2 In contrast, the arrangement and completion of large-scale financing 
operations ground to a halt in 2007 (see Chart 2.2.D). From the standpoint of the stability of 
the Spanish banking system, the risks in this segment are very contained. The reasons for this 
are that the financing has been successfully syndicated, normally among foreign credit institu-
tions (only about 17% of the financing granted is from domestic institutions), that it has been 
conducted in the main in relation to highly profitable companies and that the risk retained is 
relatively low. Historically, moreover, the doubtful assets ratio of large-scale credit operations 
has been virtually nil. 
Doubtful assets in business in Spain continue to increase (53% in 2007), due to developments in 
those from the resident private sector (see Chart 2.3.A). This tendency is related, on one hand, to 
the recent dynamics of interest rates in the euro area, but at the same time, and significantly, it is 
the natural consequence of the strong growth of credit in the past, given the lag between the 
expansion of lending and the emergence of bad debts. Across the different sectors of activity, it 
can be seen that those in which the expansion of credit was sharper in the past are now posting 
higher rates of change in their doubtful assets. In this respect, under the category of households, 
doubtful assets are growing more sharply in credit for house purchases. In the business sector, it 
is the construction and property development sectors that evidence the biggest increases, while 
in step with the financial soundness of Spanish non-financial corporations, other business activi-
ties are posting very moderate increases in respect of doubtful assets.
In any event, the rate of change of doubtful assets should be interpreted bearing in mind their 
very low volumes in Spanish bank balance sheets (see Chart 2.3.B), in particular in financing 
for house purchases and in construction and property development activities. 
An international comparison of doubtful assets ratios merely reinforces the low starting level of 
Spanish banks. The Spanish banking system has the lowest doubtful assets ratios among the 
developed European banking systems (see Chart 2.3.C). Of particular note is the difference 
with the banking systems of the three biggest euro area countries, whose doubtful assets ra-
tios are five times bigger.3
Further, the level of coverage of doubtful assets is far higher at Spanish banks. Spanish pru-
dential regulations require that credit risk be appropriately covered, but not only that incurred 
and identified in specific operations, but also that which, having been incurred, cannot be 
identified in specific operations. Currently, then, provisions for bad debts cover the volume of 
doubtful assets more than twice over (see Chart 2.3.D), whereby if the latter were to increase 
twofold, banks at the aggregate level would have the necessary provisions, without this bear-
ing on their results. What is more, if a loss given default (LGD) of around one-third is consid-
ered for the overall portfolio (which is very demanding in the case of the mortgage portfolio), 
the volume of doubtful assets covered by the funds set aside rises sixfold. Conversely, for the 
average of European banks, the coverage of doubtful assets is somewhat below 65% of 
doubtful assets.
The risks associated with 
large-scale corporate 
financing and LBOs are very 
contained.
Against a background of 
interest-rate rises, doubtful 
assets are growing. 
Nonetheless, they are also 
doing so because of the 
strong growth of credit in 
the past...
… while starting levels are 
very low in bank balance 
sheets,…
… as well as in comparison 
with other European 
banking systems…
… and in relation to the 
funds set aside to cover 
them.
2. See Manzano, María-Cruz, “La evolución de las operaciones de leverage buy out y su financiación: posibles implica-
ciones para la estabilidad financiera”, published in Estabilidad Financiera, No. 13. 3. Some differences in the doubtful 
assets ratios can be attributed to different accounting definitions and practices. For example, some countries may per-
manently hold doubtful assets on their balance sheet once full provision has been made for them (they would only disap-
pear if the related amount was recovered). In Spain, the usual practice is to derecognise them (they become bad debts) 
once four years have elapsed after their going into arrears. However, even adding bad debts to doubtful assets, the new 
ratio would continue to be very low in comparison with that of other countries.
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In spite of the growth of doubtful assets, and of the slight rise in doubtful assets ratios over the 
last year, these ratios remain at low levels (0.84% for total credit to the resident private sector 
in December 2007). In terms of the different sectors of activity (see Chart 2.4.A), the biggest 
rise is in credit to households, both for house purchases (0.69%) and, especially, in lending for 
other purposes (2.11%). The increase in bad debts of non-financial corporations, which was 
less than for households, is concentrated in its entirety in the construction and property devel-
opment sectors, which nevertheless show very low ratios (0.72% and 0.49%, respectively). 
The distribution of the doubtful assets ratio across banks and the recent trend thereof confirm 
that the low levels of these ratios are generalised (see Chart 2.4.B).
If a broader historical perspective is adopted, the lower levels of the current doubtful assets 
ratios are once again corroborated. Beyond the fact that the macroeconomic position in Spain 
at present is not comparable with that in the early 90s (budget deficit and high unemployment 
rate), if more adverse developments than expected were to ensue, the starting levels of the 
Despite rising slightly, 
doubtful assets ratios 
remain at very low levels, all 
the more so if a broader 
timespan is adopted…
… both for banks 
considered individually…
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ratio would be seen to be significantly lower (see Chart 2.4.C). This can be explained, first, by 
the fact that Spain’s membership of an area of stability such as the euro area has entailed a 
significant structural change (a notable decline in interest rates) and, further, because over 
these years Spanish credit institutions have significantly improved their control and risk man-
agement mechanisms.
The foregoing is further substantiated when the default rate curves for new loans granted in 
the years prior to the 1993 crisis are compared with those currently being recorded. These 
curves, approximated with data from the Banco de España CCR, allow the monitoring over 
time of the new loans extended on a certain date and the determination, at each point in time, 
… and for the credits 
recently extended.
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of the proportion accounted for by doubtful assets in relation to the total amount of those loans 
that are being monitored.4 Hence, for the mortgage portfolio,5 in the two years prior to 1993 
there was a very marked increase in the curves, while the levels attained were significantly 
greater than those observed in 2007 (see Chart 2.4.D). Accordingly, the deterioration in the 
new mortgages extended in the early 90s was appreciably more marked than that being re-
corded today. If the default rate curves for new loans granted to corporations are analysed, the 
conclusion is the same: both the slope of the curves and the level attained are considerably 
lower in the last three years than those observed between 1991 and 1993. 
Setting the trend of mortgage defaults against that observed in the United States, which is 
undergoing particularly intense difficulties in the real estate market, it is clear there are no 
similarities between the two cases (see Chart 2.5.A). If overall mortgages granted in Spain are 
compared with US prime-segment mortgages, Spanish banks can be seen to maintain a very 
low default level, even bearing in mind the recent rise and the possibility that defaults may 
continue worsening in the near future.
The comparison between the default rate curves for the respective Spanish and US mortgage 
markets simply reinforces the differences between both markets, not only in the level of the 
curves but also, above all, in their time profile.6 As discussed in the previous FSR, a significant 
increase in the slope of these curves largely highlights a relaxing of risk control standards in 
loan origination (adverse selection in the granting of credit). The comparison of the curves in 
the US prime market with all mortgages in Spain highlights the non-existence of adverse se-
lection in the mortgages granted in the last three years in Spain (see Chart 2.5.B).
While the CCR data do not allow a distinction to be drawn between first and second residences, 
it is possible to study the default rate curves for the Spanish Mediterranean and island provinces, 
where there is a higher proportion of second dwellings. Although the levels of the curves are 
slightly higher, as might be expected, the time profile is very similar, once again highlighting the 
absence of adverse selection in this geographical area in recent periods. Comparing these 
curves not with US sub-prime loans, with which they obviously bear no relation since in Spain 
the sub-prime business segment does not exist (see Chart 2.5.C), but with the curves for inter-
mediate quality loans (Alt-A) granted in the United States, it can be seen that the trend of the 
curves and the levels of defaults reached are in no way comparable (see Chart 2.5.D). 
In short, whether using information on doubtful assets ratios or resorting to the approximation 
of the default rate curves, with the limitations described, no parallel can be found between the 
Spanish and US mortgage markets, in particular when comparing the former with the riskier 
US mortgage lending market.
It has already been ascertained that the level of the doubtful assets ratios and the trend of the 
default rate curves for corporate loans have shown no significant increases. But it is true that 
some business segments, in particular that of financing to property developers, have grown 
very substantially this decade and are now witnessing a sharper slowdown in credit. For that 
The doubtful assets ratios 
for the overall portfolio and 
for recent loans are far lower 
than those recorded in the 
United States...
… and not only in the sub-
prime segment (non-existent 
in Spain) but also in the 
prime segment.
There are no visible 
problems of excessive laxity 
either in the granting of 
second-residence loans…
… or in corporate loans.
4. See the previous FSR for a detailed description of the calculation of these and other similar curves (default rates). What 
is involved here is an approximation to the actual curves for doubtful amounts because the information available at 
present in the CCR does not allow a perfect monitoring of operations over time. 5. Given that the CCR does not explic-
itly hold information on mortgages for house purchases, all financial loans granted to households for an amount over 
€60,000, with a term of over five years, 100% secured and set up by fewer than four parties have been considered under 
this classification. 6. The comparison should be viewed with some caution since, in addition to the caveats mentioned 
in footnotes 4 and 5, US data consider defaults after 60 days have elapsed, while for Spain defaults are included after 90 
days (the definition of default) as are, in addition, doubtful amounts for reasons other than default (which may be opera-
tions still current in payment).
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reason, it is worth conducting stress tests of Spanish deposit institutions in the face of poten-
tial difficulties in this business segment.7
Thus, an initial test consists of multiplying the doubtful assets ratio for credit to developers at 
the worst point of the previous business cycle (13.1% in December 1993) by current exposure, 
in December 2007, and considering a loss given default of 50% (recovery rate of 50%), which 
The Spanish banking 
system has the resilience to 
withstand, without seeing its
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7. The exercise excludes construction companies as they represent a smaller-sized segment whose relative weight in 
banks’ corporate credit portfolios has held fairly stable. Moreover, construction companies are generally more diversified 
(public works, housing, infrastructure, basic services, etc.) than property developers and, therefore, less sensitive to the 
business cycle.
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is very high given that real estate assets are involved. Under these demanding assumptions 
the total loss would only account for 63% of the current provision for bad debts. A less drastic 
scenario, taking into account the significant changes in the Spanish economy, in the financial 
position of companies and in credit risk management by banks, but one with severe assump-
tions about the course of productive activity in the coming two years (stagnant growth), envis-
ages doubtful assets ratios at around half those observed at the 1993 peak. These ratios, 
combined with a loss given default of 50%, translate into an impact on the provisions for bad 
debts of 31%. Accordingly, the Spanish banking system, thanks to a conservative provisioning 
policy in this decade, is in a position to withstand a rapid and significant deterioration in de-
faults in the real-estate development segment, were such an occurrence to take place. In 
these scenarios, and insofar as the general provisions are part, in a specific proportion,8 of 
regulatory capital, the buffer tier 2 capital held by banks over the legally required minimum 
would be affected and reduced slightly.
The — currently manageable — credit risk to which Spanish deposit institutions are ex-
posed is not the only management challenge they face in the immediate future. Since last 
summer the international financial system has undergone a notable contraction in liquidity. 
At the international level credit institutions are encountering greater difficulties in obtaining 
financing in wholesale markets, which illustrates how important it is to pursue appropriate 
liquidity management, while being able to draw on a set of well-diversified sources of fi-
nancing.
During recent years, against a background of credit growth and of favourable conditions in 
international financial markets, Spanish deposit institutions have financed a portion of the 
growth of their activity by resorting to the medium-and long-term wholesale markets.9 This has 
made for a relative reduction in the proportion of credit accounted for by deposits which, 
nonetheless, stood in December 2007 at close to 80% (see Chart 2.6.A). The use of the me-
dium- and long-term wholesale market has afforded Spanish deposit institutions greater flex-
ibility in their financial structure, although the cost has been greater than if the financing had 
been short-term.
Consequently, although Spanish banks have not shunned the possibilities offered by financial 
markets and new products, they have at the same time maintained a sound deposits base for 
their financing. The banking model in Spain is structured around a series of elements which, 
though they do not make the model totally immune to the recent turbulence given increas-
ingly integrated financial markets, do contribute to it currently having sufficient mechanisms to 
withstand such turbulence.10
Firstly, Spanish banks engage in a typically retail-oriented activity, with an extensive office net-
work and close contact with customers. Also, they manage a very high percentage of both 
investment funds (80%) and pension funds (50%). Their business model allows them, if the 
turbulence should persist over time, to progressively replace wholesale funding with the raising 
of deposits, in part using their proven commercial ability to change the combination of prod-
ucts offered to their customers (deposits, funds, etc.). In December 2007, time deposits, which 
accounted for close to 60% of total deposits and are the most stable, maintained the sharp 
growth they had been posting in recent months (a 27% increase), although total deposits are 
Spanish banks have to 
operate in an international 
environment in which 
liquidity has contracted.
The percentage of credit 
financed with deposits is at 
a high level.
The retail banking model 
prevalent in Spain offers 
greater scope for raising a 
higher proportion of 
deposits should this be 
necessary.
8. General provisions, of up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets, are eligible as regulatory tier 2 capital. 9. Box 2.1 analy-
ses the financial instruments through which Spanish banks have financed themselves on the wholesale markets. 10. Box 
2.2 analyses the challenges to the traditional business model (buy-and-hold) compared with other recent banking model 
trends (originate-to-distribute).
solvency affected, a 
potentially severe 
deterioration in the credit 
quality of property 
developers.
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increasing at a lesser rate (some 16 pp less). Further, since last summer there have been sus-
tained reductions in investment fund net assets.
Secondly, Spanish banks had used asset securitisation intensely as a mechanism for seeking 
financing. Far from moving towards an originate-to-distribute model, asset securitisation has 
been characterised by its simplicity, avoiding the use of complex products (CDOs, CLOs, 
etc.)11 and keeping a very significant portion of risks on the balance sheet. This has prevented 
the introduction of perverse incentives that might adversely affect the pursuit of a rigorous 
credit extension policy, since there has been no separation between risk origination and man-
agement.
As indicated in the previous FSR, the quality of mortgage-backed securities is very high in 
Spain. This is reflected in the moderate loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of mortgage-backed secu-
rities, which stood at an average of around 70% (see Chart 2.7.A). Moreover, the underlying 
portfolio of these securitisations shows low geographical concentration, which is identical to 
that of the non-securitised portfolio. Most of the bonds arising from the securitisation proc-
ess (93%) are top-rated by the rating agencies (see Chart 2.7.B), meaning that, with a 
doubtful assets ratio such as the present one (lower than 1%), it is difficult to think that 
credit portfolio defaults may affect the higher-quality bonds. Defaults on mortgage-backed 
securities in Spain in December 2007 stood at very low levels, in particular when compared 
with other European banks’ securitisations (see Chart 2.7.C). In addition, the average LTV of 
total mortgage loans outstanding of Spanish deposit institutions does not reach 50%, given 
the average life and the distribution of the total mortgages granted. If this LTV were calcu-
lated at current house prices, it would be even lower. Accordingly, not only is the quality of 
mortgage-backed securities high but so too is that of the total mortgage portfolio, which 
reinforces its role as an additional guarantee for covered bonds. Finally, it should be men-
tioned that Spanish banks have increasingly securitised not only mortgages but also loans 
to SMEs, which are officially guaranteed, consumer loans and loans for car purchases (see 
Chart 2.7.D). 
Spanish banks have not 
developed complex 
securitisation structures…
… and are characterised by 
the high credit quality of 
their securitised portfolios…
… which is reflected in their 
low default rates in relation 
to those observed in 
securitisations carried out 
by other countries’ banks.
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11. At the international level, on occasions, Spanish securitisations of loans to SMEs (placed through special-purpose 
entities called FTPYMES) are classified as CDOs. However, this classification is not appropriate, since the securitised 
portfolios do not comply with the main defining characteristic of CDOs, because in the case of the FTPYMES what are 
involved are uniform and highly granular portfolios.
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BOX 2.1FINANCING OF SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS ON THE WHOLESALE MARKETS
In recent years the growth rate of lending by Spanish deposit institu-
tions has remained strong. Most credit is financed through deposits. 
However, as in other banking systems, Spanish institutions have had 
recourse to the wholesale markets. Spanish institutions have opted 
particularly for long-term financing, and so, by forgoing lower cost 
short-term financing, they have endowed their liability structure with 
greater flexibility and stability.
Financing has been obtained on the wholesale markets through a 
wide range of financial instruments, including most notably (40% of 
outstandings in 2007) fixed income (Table A). Second in importance 
is asset securitisation (34% of outstandings in 2007), which in Spain, 
unlike in other countries, has been used as a means of obtaining 
funds and not for transferring risk. 9% of financing is obtained by is-
suing shares and hybrid instruments (basically subordinated debt and 
preference shares) and the rest is raised in issues via resident and 
non-resident subsidiaries (recently almost exclusively commercial pa-
per).
Within the outstanding balance of securitisations, a distinction can be 
made between asset securitisations and those consisting of securi-
tised covered bonds, which account for 33% of the balance out-
standing in 2007 of the total securitisations in 2007. Institutions can 
issue covered bonds directly on the market (included in fixed-income 
securities in Table A) or through securitisation special purpose enti-
ties. 
This has enabled medium-sized institutions in particular to gain im-
proved access to the market and reduce the cost of financing. Re-
gardless of how the covered bonds are issued, their quality, aside 
from that associated with eligible loans,1 is very high: legally they 
must be over-collateralised by at least 25%; and, in the event of insol-
vency of the issuer, the institution is liable with all its mortgage loans 
(except those assigned to asset securitisations) and, in addition, re-
course can be had to the issuer’s total assets.
The fixed income securities include most notably mortgage covered 
bonds (38% of outstandings in 2007), bonds and debentures (32%), 
which are characterised by their long term, and commercial paper 
(26%). The situation besetting financial markets means that institu-
tions are finding it more difficult to issue long-term securities and so 
have stepped up commercial paper issues.
This means that, although institutions have been able to continue to 
raise funds on the wholesale markets, they have done so via shorter-
term instruments. Nevertheless, the residual maturities, including is-
sues by subsidiaries (excluding commercial paper), indicate that 10% 
of outstandings fall due in 2008, 31% between 2009 and 2012, and 
the remaining 59% after 2013. Therefore, the term structure suggests 
that the pressures derived from international financial market turbu-
lence for 2008 are limited.
1. Mortgage loans with an LTV of 80% (60% for commercial mortgages).
Own issues Issues by securitisation special purpose entities
Medium- and long-term fixed income Shares and hybrids
Asset SSPEs
Bonds
and
debentures
Mortgage
covered
bonds
Territorial
covered
bonds
Subordinated
shares
Preference
shares Shares
Mortgage
SSPEs
Of which: 
multi-issuer
covered bonds
Commercial
paper
2005 79,862 89,641 9,595 22,994 414 50,746 106,011 24,077 142,995 63,728 4,351 57,053
2006 111,123 132,993 12,245 28,057 1,126 54,318 141,202 25,025 210,950 89,398 5,448 69,878
2007 128,836 150,449 17,384 27,454 1,192 59,736 178,640 23,713 319,598 112,593 643 103,509
Bonds and commitments
Own issues of 
short-term fixed 
income securities:
commercial paper
Issues by 
subsidiaries
Debentures
FINANCING ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS TABLE A
Total amount outstanding. € m
Maturities schedule
Total balance at 31-12-2007
Maturity
up to June 2008
Maturity
from July to December 2008
Maturity
2009
Maturity
2010
Maturity
2011
Maturity
2012
Maturity
from 2013
(excl. commercial paper) 847,266 44,985 37,212 80,341 65,263 56,883 60,296 502,286
SOURCE: In-house calculations based on market information.
The higher cost of financing via securitisations, along with the withdrawal of a large number of 
institutional investors from this market, has led Spanish financial institutions to modify their 
conduct. They have continued securitising, with a 55% increase in 2007 to €142 billion, ap-
proximately half of which were issued during the second half of the year. The difference from 
the situation prior to the financial turbulence is that now, and for precautionary reasons, just as 
other European banks are doing, asset-backed bonds are being retained so as to have addi-
tional collateral with which to obtain — if necessary — financing from other financial interme-
diaries through repos (obtaining liquidity by delivering the collateral as security for the opera-
tion, i.e. secured lending).
The difficulties in 
international securitisation 
markets have led Spanish 
banks to retain bonds on 
their balance sheets, 
increasing collateral for 
precautionary reasons. 
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In the second half of 2007, Spanish banks increased, in comparison with what for them was 
habitual, their use of Eurosystem liquidity, although its weight is very limited in the bank bal-
ance sheet as a whole (1.3% in December 2007 or €44 billion euro of net lending). Nonethe-
less, only a small proportion of the collateral used is from new securitisations. It should be 
pointed out that this means of operating adheres fully to the working framework of monetary 
policy operations in the euro area, in terms both of the operation and of the collateral used (see 
Box 2.3). In this respect, the Eurosystem has not increased the volume of financing extended 
to the euro area as a whole, but has made available to banks longer-dated and more frag-
mented financing and, with a view to promoting confidence, it has done so providing more li-
quidity initially, conducting liquidity-absorbing operations more intensely subsequently. 
Regarding Spanish banks, if the liquidity they have obtained from the Eurosystem is compared 
with Spain’s relative weight in terms of GDP in the Eurosystem (proxied by Spain’s capital key 
Spanish banks have 
increased their use of 
Eurosystem liquidity…
…though its significance is 
very small in the total 
balance sheet. Moreover, 
this is in accordance with 
their weight in the 
Eurosystem and is relatively 
less than for other countries’ 
banks.
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BOX 2.2MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES FOR THE DIFFERENT BANKING MODELS
The purpose of this Box is to assess the medium-term challenges 
that the difficulties in international financial markets since last summer 
pose to the two basic banking business models: the originate-to-
distribute model versus the buy-and-hold model. Under the first 
model, lender institutions transfer credit risk to the market, normally 
through investment banks (or universal banks with significant invest-
ment banking segments) and using complex instruments. Under the 
second model banks retain a significant portion of the credit risk, be-
ing able to use asset securitisation as a source of financing.
In the originate-to-distribute model there is a serious problem con-
cerning the incentives to properly select and monitor the borrowers’ 
credit risk. The difficulties in the sub-prime segment have starkly 
highlighted this incentives problem. Accordingly, this type of origi-
nate-to-distribute means of operating will either decline drastically 
(rejection by the investors of the full transfer of risk and of the lack of 
incentives of the originators) or else banks that maintain this type of 
business will have to pay a far higher risk premium to finance the 
activity, and one in keeping with the level of risk of the underlying as-
set.
At the second stage of the originate-to-distribute model are invest-
ment banks. These take responsibility for structuring securitisations 
and distributing them among investors in exchange for the corre-
sponding fees. They would not only securitise and place the original 
loans but, in successive stages, they would create and distribute in-
creasingly more complex products based on the original asset-
backed bonds. The habitual practice was to construct new securiti-
sations by grouping different bonds with different levels of risk in order 
to place them with investors with different appetites for risk. Indeed, 
the high-risk tranches were easier to place than super-senior debt 
owing to the different return/risk ratio. This activity produced a sub-
stantial flow of income for these banks. 
Successive securitisations ultimately became highly complex prod-
ucts that were very difficult to value. And given the current circum-
stances, the demand for them fell markedly. This is the second chal-
lenge facing the originate-to-distribute model. Investors are unlikely 
to rapidly resume purchases of this type of highly complex product 
whose valuation is through mark-to models. Consequently, this busi-
ness segment, which is very important for investment banks and for 
major universal banks with a strong investment banking presence, is 
going to cease to contribute significantly to the results of these banks 
and, probably, it will make a scaling down in size and in business 
expectations in the medium term necessary. In fact, the trend in the 
market prices of these banks since last summer is already highlight-
ing the change in expectations.
Another segment that may be substantially impacted is that of lever-
aged buy-outs (LBOs). The change in market conditions has left a 
substantial volume of credit in the hands of the originators of these 
operations (pipeline risk). In fact, investment banks were participating 
very actively in these leveraged buy-outs because they knew that 
they could distribute a large part of the risk to third parties. Problems 
concerning incentives and future business volume once again 
emerge, with potentially significant consequences for the results of 
these banks.
In addition to the impact on their earnings, with a highly significant 
reduction in income and notable losses as their financial instruments 
depreciate, these banks will see how their reputational risk grows 
(along with the possibility of facing losses due to customer claims). 
This is because, first, they have sold highly complex products without 
having sufficient information on the quality of the underlying assets 
and, further, they themselves have been incapable of properly meas-
uring the risk they were incurring (taking as valid the ratings accorded 
by rating agencies or being unable to see that the default correlations 
in the underlying loans portfolio might be significantly affected).
Poor credit risk management, including the resort to hedges that 
might prove ineffective, entails a serious setback for these banks. In 
this case it is not only a question of reputation; the enormous losses 
these banks are incurring, which have forced them to recapitalise at 
a very high cost, must also be taken into account.
Furthermore, the foregoing calls the incentives system into question. 
The excessive weight of reward in terms of current income has con-
tributed to increasing the short-sightedness of the managers of these 
banks, with a high cost for shareholders.
The enormous volatility of their income statements, to which the pro-
cyclicality of fair value may contribute, will translate into a higher risk 
premium and, therefore, into a higher cost of funding. Conceivably, 
moves into high-risk business will be weighed up more carefully 
henceforth, auguring a significant narrowing of margins which, com-
bined with the decline in business volume (securitisations, CDOs, 
LBOs, etc.), will exert pressure in the medium term on the income 
statement and solvency of banks that pursue this business model.
As a matter of fact, the originate-to-distribute model has been under-
pinned by arbitrage of regulatory capital (conduits, SIVs, skewed rat-
ings) and by very high leverage, facilitated by the low risk premiums 
in recent years. 
Set against the above model is the traditional buy-and-hold banking 
model based on closeness between bank and customer, on both the 
assets and liabilities sides, which reinforces the value of the banking 
franchise. A bank very close to its customer, with a dense office net-
work that allows it to maintain a close relationship with the customer, 
adjusting to the latter’s needs and, therefore, increasing customer 
loyalty, is a bank that is going to be able to step up the raising of 
deposits and replace, in part, the loss of funding from the wholesale 
market with retail market funds.
Retail banking based on closeness does not only sell banking prod-
ucts but also other alternative products for placing savings (investment 
and pension funds, life insurance, etc.). Naturally, heightened competi-
tion for deposits will raise the cost of the funds obtained but, in any 
event, to a lesser extent than the funds from a wholesale market.
The increase in the cost of funding is not going to squeeze the mar-
gins of all banks in the same way. Those with a high percentage of 
fixed-rate loans will see a much swifter and significant narrowing of 
margins than those with floating-rate loans that can transfer more 
rapidly the permanent change in risk premia.
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BOX 2.2MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES FOR THE DIFFERENT BANKING MODELS (cont.)
During the period of adjustment to the new market conditions, it is 
important that banks should obtain financing from different sources. 
In this respect, the precautionary collateralisation of assets allows 
banks to build up a stock of collateral that can be used to obtain 
financing from other financial intermediaries (secured interbank fi-
nancing, repos with other intermediaries, private placements of 
funds, etc.). The existence of good-quality collateral, with the dis-
counts considered appropriate, gives banks considerable room for-
manoeuvre to progressively increase the term of financing, diversi-
fying the sources thereof. The quality of this collateral is high, firstly, 
because what is generally involved are loans with a high degree of 
granularity, i.e. of a small amount and highly diversified across sec-
tors and geographical areas; and secondly, because the measure-
ment of the risk of this collateral is very straightforward (they are 
bank loans, not tranches or successive tranches of securitisa-
tions).
Among retail banks there are usually different strategies, and there 
may be well-positioned banks in terms of liquidity that take advan-
tage of the current circumstances to gain market share in the different 
segments of the credit market (mortgages, consumer loans, SMEs, 
etc.), which should contribute to sustaining dynamic credit growth. 
That is to say, there is not only competition now to raise deposits but 
also to gain market share in loans. 
The Spanish banking system, which fits in with the buy-and-hold mod-
el, evidences features that should make adaptation to the new finan-
cial market situation easier. These include, among others, a strong 
presence — of banks, savings banks and cooperative banks — in the 
retail business; the scant weight of fixed-rate and very long-dated 
asset-side operations and, therefore, a greater facility to pass through 
the increase in the cost of funding to assets; and the possibility of 
using high-quality collateral (credit defaults in Spain are among the 
lowest in Europe) in refinancing operations, initiating the diversifica-
tion of financing sources and the lengthening of maturities. Moreover, 
mention should be made of Spanish banks’ great adaptability to a 
highly competitive and changing environment. 
In short, the new circumstances in international financial markets 
pose challenges to the two predominant banking models (originate-
to-distribute and buy-and-hold). Looking ahead, the traditional buy-
and-hold banking model, which is less affected by the current finan-
cial turbulence, might conceivably take on board the sounder aspects 
of the originate-to-distribute model insofar as these should pass the 
turbulence test. In any event, banks would have to consider this 
process from a prudent standpoint, ensuring that they have sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the elements susceptible to be in-
corporated, and appropriate systems for measuring and managing 
the risks that may be assumed.
in the ECB), it is currently still below this capital key (see Chart 2.8). Some banking systems 
have traditionally accounted for a far greater weight than that corresponding to them in terms 
of their relative size, without this having entailed any problem for these banks or for the Eu-
rosystem. Indeed, at present other smaller banking systems in the euro area are also applying 
for liquidity from the Eurosystem on a level greater than corresponds to their relative weight 
without — once again — this entailing any difficulty for their banks; rather, it essentially reflects 
structural characteristics of their banking systems.
The Eurosystem has not altered its eligible collateral criteria since the turbulence began last 
summer, and as a result collateral quality remains very high (only super-senior tranches of se-
curitisations are eligible).12 An AAA rating for a super-senior tranche of an initial mortgage-
backed asset is far different, as evidence has shown in recent months, than an AAA rating for 
a re-securitisation (CDO of ABS or CDO squared). As the different asset-backed bonds are 
progressively securitised and repackaged in successive securitisations, the distribution of 
losses becomes more complex to estimate, while the risks to investors increase.
Another change in the behaviour of Spanish banks regarding wholesale market financing is 
that, in view of the current market conditions, longer-dated fixed-income issues have been 
replaced by shorter-dated ones (see Chart 2.9.A).13 The favourable aspect is that banks, in 
what are difficult market conditions, have been able to obtain financing which, as for most of 
their European counterparts, has had to be concentrated in shorter terms. In any event, the 
Moreover, through 
commercial paper issues, 
Spanish banks have been 
able to obtain financing in 
the wholesale markets.
12. See chapter 3 of the previous FSR for a detailed analysis of the Eurosystem’s collateral policy compared with that of 
other central banks. 13. The data in Chart 2.9.A do not include commercial paper issued from subsidiaries, which has 
grown significantly in recent months.
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balance sheet data for 2007 show that liquidity spreads by maturity have not changed signifi-
cantly. Finally, another positive factor to be considered is the interbank position (interbank as-
sets minus interbank liabilities): an analysis of this shows that, as indicated in the previous 
FSR, Spanish domestic banks are net lenders, Spanish savings banks have a balanced posi-
tion and foreign banks, subsidiaries and branches are net borrowers (see Chart 2.9.B).
The shortening of maturities, although this is a natural development in a situation of uncer-
tainty such as that at present, is also an element that banks must manage appropriately in the 
medium term. In this respect, Spanish banks, and the Banco de España, have been aware of 
the significance of this risk. This is why banks, in step with their level of activity and their degree 
of internationalisation, have for years been improving their mechanisms for evaluating liquidity 
requirements. They have also developed stress tests and contingency plans, and have estab-
lished limits and internal controls. The financing in recent years in the medium-and long-term 
wholesale markets is an example of prudent management of the financial structure.
The possibility that tensions in obtaining liquidity may ultimately impact credit, if the difficulties 
in international financial markets persist, can be evaluated through a stress test. In this con-
nection, different scenarios of funds raised are considered. If during 2008 Spanish banks were 
unable to obtain financing through asset securitisation, or through issuing covered bonds, if 
they were also practically unable to roll over those covered bonds maturing this year,14 and if 
liquidity obtained from the Eurosystem did not exceed the capital key (as at present) and the 
growth rates of commercial paper and of bonds were to fall significantly, then credit to the 
resident private sector might grow at a rate of around 10% with growth in deposits similar to 
that recorded in 2007. That is to say, even in a highly unfavourable wholesale financial market 
scenario, there should not be an overly pronounced effect on credit to the private sector in 
2008. What is more, and insofar as the demand for credit slows, especially in real estate 
sector-related activities, the aforementioned growth rates of credit appear to be aligned with 
the path of such demand.
Resort to the Eurosystem 
and the shortening of 
maturities are challenges 
that banks have to manage 
appropriately…
… although stress tests do 
not point to a very 
pronounced impact on 
credit in 2008, even if 
liquidity conditions were to 
remain unfavourable.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Capital key: approximate relative weighting of each country's institutions
in the Eurosystem as a whole in terms of its GDP.
14. Note that the covered bonds have been issued at long maturities and their amount has grown considerably only in 
recent years. That is to say, the amounts maturing this year are fairly small in comparison with the total volume of existing 
covered bonds.
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It must also be borne in mind that this type of exercise does not consider other management 
alternatives available to credit institutions, such as, for example, the realisation of assets on 
the market (sales of assets held for trading, of available-for-sale assets and also of invest-
ments). Fairly uniformly across banks, these assets account for around 10% of their balance 
sheet. This high proportion of assets that may be realised on organised markets means that 
the comparison of Spanish banks’ liquid assets and liabilities shows a high degree of correla-
tion, without any particular signs of concern for Spanish deposit institutions (see Charts 
2.10.A and B).
Despite the fact that developments in international financial markets in the second half of 2007 
were very unfavourable, Spanish deposit institutions’ results at the close of the year showed 
very significant and generalised growth. That marks a very good starting point for addressing 
the current challenges in the context of the heightening difficulties in international financial 
markets.
Group net income increased by 19.3% (see Table 2.2), meaning that the ROA (after tax) rose 
by 3 bp in relation to December 2006 to 1.05%. The ROE grew slightly compared with 2006, 
rising to 19.9%. The increase in the ROE is mainly underpinned by improved efficiency and 
productivity, this being compatible with a diminished risk profile, and with an increase in pru-
dential provisions and in the quality of capital (see Chart 2.11.A). Moreover, the increase in the 
ROE has been experienced by most banks (Chart 2.11.B)
The strength of the income statement can be seen in its three main margins, which not only 
increased significantly in absolute values compared with 2006 (at a rate of over 16%), but also 
did so in terms of ATA. The quarterly trend of the main margins, and of net group income (see 
Chart 2.12.A), highlights the fact that Spanish banks, unlike those in other countries, have not 
been directly affected by the sub-prime crisis. In this respect, it should be recalled that, as in-
dicated in the previous FSR, Spanish deposit institutions’ direct (loans) and indirect (CDOs) 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
The data for 2007 confirm 
the soundness of Spanish 
deposit institutions’ 
profitability...
… based on the favourable 
trend of operating margins, 
which have not been 
affected by the sub-prime 
crisis.
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BOX 2.3MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCIAL TURBULENCE
Monetary policy implementation differs substantially across countries 
and monetary areas. For example, there are notable differences be-
tween the Eurosystem and the US Federal Reserve, to cite just two 
central banks. In the euro area there is a structural liquidity deficit, the 
consequence of the existence of a reserve requirement and of how 
banknotes are issued, which obliges banks increasingly to resort to 
the Eurosystem to obtain the liquidity they need. In the United States 
there is no such liquidity deficit, given that in effective terms the re-
serve requirement is relatively moderate and, essentially, because the 
Federal Reserve holds a securities portfolio on the asset-side of its 
balance sheet which offsets the changes in banknotes issued, 
whereby liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve are much more 
moderate.
There are also policy differences in respect of the collateral accepted 
by each central bank in exchange for the liquidity they extend to 
banks. Generally, the Federal Reserve’s collateral policy is more re-
strictive than that of the Eurosystem. Since last summer, the Eurosys-
tem has not changed its collateral policy, while the Federal Reserve 
has in fact done so, making it more flexible.
Accordingly, a high volume of liquidity injection by the Eurosystem is 
part of the monetary policy implementation framework in the euro 
area. So too is the fact that banks resort both to the marginal lending 
facility (at a higher rate than the MRO rate) to obtain overnight financ-
ing, in the face of unexpected needs, and to the deposit facility (at a 
lower rate than the MRO rate) to deposit unexpected liquidity sur-
pluses overnight. 
Banks’ liquidity needs, both in the Eurosystem as a whole and in 
Spain, have held stable over the past 18 months. This is consistent 
with a reallocation of liquidity across countries and banks within the 
euro area. The increase in the use of Eurosystem liquidity by Spanish 
banks since last summer (from around €15 billion to approximately 
€44 billion) scarcely accounts for 1.3% of their overall balance sheet. 
Therefore, the use Spanish banks are making of Eurosystem liquidity 
adheres fully to the arrangements and instruments envisaged by the 
Eurosystem.
Spanish banks, like their European counterparts inside and outside 
the euro area, are increasing their collateral. There are three reasons 
for this. Firstly, they are doing so out of precaution: given the doubts 
as to how long markets will be closed, banks are building up high-
quality collateral that will allow them to obtain liquidity from the Eu-
rosystem. Secondly, they want to be able to have access to secured 
lending. Thirdly, because in a securitisation process there are two 
steps. The first is to convert the non-liquid assets (loans) into liquid 
instruments (asset-backed bonds). The second is to place these 
bonds on the market. As the markets progressively open, banks al-
ready holding an asset-backed bonds portfolio can gain much quick-
er access to these markets.
In the light of recent events, debate has arisen about whether the 
monetary policy should accept asset-backed bonds as collateral. 
However, what is important concerning the acceptance of specific 
collateral is its quality. As regards bonds stemming from securitisa-
tions, those derived from so-called traditional securitisations do pos-
sess this high degree of quality which, given recent events, does not 
appear to be the case for those whose origin is more complex secu-
ritisation processes (CDO, CDO of ABS, CDO square, etc.).
In this respect, the Eurosystem has not changed or made its collat-
eral policy more flexible. The quality required of eligible assets is very 
high. In the case of mortgage-backed securities, only the super-sen-
ior tranche (AAA) is accepted. For example, this tranche usually ac-
counts for 93% of the bonds issued. Therefore, to incur losses on an 
AAA bond, the probability of default on mortgage loans would have 
to rise to 14%, with a loss in the event of default of 50%. These 
amounts are totally inconceivable for a Spanish mortgage loan port-
folio. At the depths of the last Spanish economic recession (1993), 
defaults in this segment peaked at 4%, while loss given default (LGD) 
was very low. Accordingly, the likelihood of incurring losses on an 
AAA Spanish mortgage-backed bond is minimal. 
In sum, the relationship between Spanish banks and the Eurosystem 
since last summer falls fully within the habitual monetary policy imple-
mentation channels used in the euro area.
exposure to the US sub-prime segment is completely marginal (0.03% of its assets and 0.68% 
of its tier 1 capital).
Net interest income grew by 19.9% on December 2006. This rate of increase, which outpaced 
that of activity, means that, in terms of average total assets (ATA), there has been a 6 bp rise 
to 1.82%. Consequently, compared with 2006, Spanish banks have been able to increase 
their relative net interest income (as a proportion of ATA) in a setting of high interest rates. The 
favourable trend of net interest income is underpinned by the growth of financial revenue, and 
particularly that arising on loans extended to customers which, despite the slowdown in cred-
it activity in 2007, are growing sharply (75 bp in terms of ATA). The increase in revenue has 
enabled the rise in financial costs, which was sharper in tradeable securities and also in the 
raising of deposits, to be offset.
Banks have been able to 
pass through the moderate 
increase in costs to assets, 
strengthening their net 
interest income.
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As a result of the current tensions in international financial markets, financing costs should 
conceivably trend upwards. Undoubtedly, this is a management challenge for Spanish de-
posit institutions insofar as it adds extra pressures to margins in the income statement. None-
theless, and unlike other countries’ banks, a high proportion of financing extended by Spanish 
banks is floating-rate, which offers greater leeway to adjust to the new circumstances in inter-
national markets. The increase in the risk premium observed in interbank interest rates (e.g. in 
the three-month or one-year Euribor), which reflects the rise in the cost of bank funding, 
passes through automatically to the borrowers that use these interest rates as a benchmark. 
The spread between marginal lending and deposit rates has held stable in the past six months, 
corroborating this pass-through capacity (see Chart 2.12.B).
The dynamism of net interest income has fed through, albeit with less intensity, to gross in-
come, which grew by 16.8% (2 bp in terms of ATA, to 3.13%). The diminished dynamism of 
gross income, notwithstanding its notable growth, is due to the moderation in commissions, 
which grew by 10.1%, falling in terms of ATA, in response above all to the course of its two 
main components. Commissions from collection and payment services grew to a lesser ex-
tent, which largely reflects stiffer competition among banks. Commissions from the marketing 
of non-bank financial products also grew at a lesser pace, due in part to developments in in-
ternational financial markets, which were unfavourable in the second half of 2007.
The most dynamic component of gross income was the results on financial transactions, 
which grew by 26.7%, and tended to offset the more moderate performance of commissions. 
The greater dynamism of results on financial transactions is partly due to sales of non-group 
holdings by certain Spanish banks, but also to the gains arising on foreign exchange transac-
tions, offsetting the poorer performance of the trading book in relation to 2006.
In this connection, it should be stressed that the exposure of Spanish deposit institutions’ in-
come statements to stock markets, whose performance since mid-2007 and in early 2008 has 
been negative, is very limited. The decline in stock market prices directly impacts banks’ trad-
The capacity to pass 
through financing costs, 
something of importance if 
the difficulties persist, is 
made easier by the granting 
of floating-rate financing.
The exposure of the income 
statement to stock markets 
is very limited.
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ing book, in terms both of the shares they hold and of share- and stock market index-based 
derivatives. However, and as mentioned, Spanish banks’ trading book positions are small. 
Estimates made by the Banco de España reveal that the direct impact of the adverse stock 
market performance in January 2008 entails a reduction of less than 0.5% in income before 
tax.
Operating expenses grew at a rate of 9.7%, which led to a reduction in their relative 
weight in terms of ATA (of 8 bp, to 1.42%). By component, developments were similar, 
with both staff costs (9.3%) and administrative expenses (10%) growing. The relative 
easing in operating expenses, combined with the expansionary behaviour of gross in-
come, enabled the efficiency ratio to continue in 2007 on the path seen in previous 
FSRs; the ratio improved from 48.31% in December 2006 to 45.38% at the end of last 
year. This favourable performance of the efficiency ratio at Spanish banks was across 
the board.
In recent years Spanish deposit institutions have embarked on an intense process of geo-
graphical expansion, which has placed pressure on operating expenses. The rise in the 
number of employees and of new offices thus helps considerably in explaining the growth 
rate of operating expenses (see Chart 2.13.A). Nonetheless, Spanish banks have shown 
notable ability in managing these expenses, as highlighted by the ongoing improvement in 
efficiency in recent years in banking business in Spain and also in Latin America (see Chart 
2.13.B).
The figures for 2007 show how the favourable performance of gross income has been bol-
stered by the containment of operating expenses, which translates into notable growth in net 
operating income (22.5%), namely 9 bp in terms of ATA (to 1.76%).
The soundness of income is 
also underpinned by banks’ 
notable operating efficiency.
DEC-07 DEC-06 DEC-07
€m
(% CHANGE)
DEC. 07-
DEC. 06
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 146,700 36.7 4.29 5.05
Financial costs 93,843 48.5 2.52 3.23
Net interest income 52,857 19.9 1.76 1.82
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method
4,369 -4.2 0.18 0.15
Net commissions 22,038 10.1 0.80 0.76
Gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities 11,758 26.7 0.37 0.40
Gross income 91,022 16.8 3.11 3.13
Operating expenses 41,305 9.7 1.50 1.42
Other operating income 1,381 -2.1 0.06 0.05
Net operating income 51,098 22.5 1.67 1.76
Asset impairment losses 14,061 60.6 0.35 0.48
Provisioning expense (net) 1,706 -54.7 0.15 0.06
Other income (net) 4,481 -33.2 0.27 0.16
Profit before tax 39,812 11.0 1.43 1.37
Net income 32,054 18.4 1.08 1.10
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Group net income 30,640 19.3 1.03 1.05
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Asset impairment losses (specific and general provisions), relating mostly to lending, grew 
sharply in total business (60.6%), due partly to the growth of doubtful assets and partly to the 
still-buoyant growth of activity. In this respect, general provisions make up around 75% of 
provisions for bad debts, which testifies to the importance accorded in Spanish prudential 
regulations to the recognition of losses incurred that are not yet identified in specific opera-
tions.
Both provisioning expenses (other than for the foregoing specific and general provi-
sions) and other income declined in relation to 2006. Provisioning fell basically due to 
the changes in those earmarked for pensions, since these had increased sharply in 
2006 owing to the behaviour of certain large institutions. Other income also declined, 
in this case due to the reduction in income associated with sales of holdings in group 
companies. Once again, income in 2006 was very high owing to the sales by certain 
banks.
In any event, impairment losses and provisioning expenses subtracted 30.8% from net operat-
ing income, a figure only slightly higher than that recorded in December 2006 (30.1%). That 
said, profit before tax grew by 11%, while income for the year did so by 18.4%. The lower 
growth of taxes was due to the strong increase the previous year further to the reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate which, having a bearing on assets and liabilities in respect of de-
ferred taxes, adversely impacted banks’ income.
As mentioned throughout this FSR, one of the consequences arising from the current financial 
turbulence is that the cost of funding for credit institutions increases. If this situation were to 
continue over time, deposit institutions’ margins might be squeezed. One very direct stress 
test that allows this possibility to be evaluated is to increase the average cost of bank liabilities 
so as to analyse the impact on banks’ recurrent income. 
The resilience of the income 
statement to a potential 
increase in the cost of 
funding is notable.
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The assessment considered is very direct for two reasons, among others. First, because a 
0.25 bp increase in the cost of bank liabilities has been considered without any possibility of it 
being passed through to assets; consequently, the increase in the cost of funding is actually a 
narrowing of the spread. Second, because no management decisions of any type by banks 
have been considered, i.e. banks have no capacity to react (either by passing through the cost 
increase to assets or by cutting operating expenses). As well as being direct, the stress test 
should be understood as being very demanding insofar as a narrowing on this scale of the 
spread is more than double that experienced by Spanish banks in the past two years.
The results show that if the average cost of funding increases by 25 bp, without any possibil-
ity of pass-through to assets, net interest income will grow at a rate of 5.4% (compared with 
19.9% in December 2007), while net operating income will do so by 7.5% (22.5% in Decem-
ber 2007). If the analysis is tightened still further by increasing the spread by 50 bp, making the 
likelihood of this scenario even more remote, net interest income will decline by 9%, while net 
operating income will do so by 7.6%.
The position of Spanish deposit institutions, and the zero direct impact the sub-prime crisis has 
had on their income in 2007, becomes apparent on comparing the major international banks. 
While the income before tax of the two biggest Spanish banks grew at a rate of close to 20%, 
the main US and — also — European banks saw their income decline significantly or even turn 
negative (see Chart 2.14.A). This is largely in response to corrections in the value of the portfo-
lios of products related to the sub-prime segment (CDOs and others) for a set of banks (see 
Chart 2.14.B) that have progressively replaced the traditional banking model with the originate-
to-distribute model. Stock market prices (see Charts 2.15.A and B) and CDS spreads (see 
Charts 2.15.C and D) confirm investors’ worse perception of those banks that depend more on 
or specialise to a greater extent in the originate-to-distribute model. However, the latest avail-
able data at the time of this FSR being released show a significant correction in CDS spreads, 
though it would appear some time must elapse before this can be definitely confirmed.
The impact of the sub-prime 
crisis has, unlike for Spanish 
banks, been very significant 
for those of other countries.
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The asset-weighted marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to house
and consumer finance and credit to non-financial corporations, while the liabilities
ones include, inter alia, fixed-term deposits and repos.
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The solvency ratios of the Spanish banking system comfortably exceed the minimum reg-
ulatory requirements. At the close of 2007, the total solvency ratio calculated under the 
Basel rules held at over 11.4%, despite declining by 50 bp. Under the stricter Spanish 
rules, the total solvency ratio stood at 10.6%, after slipping by 55 bp. The tier 1 ratio was 
up to 7.5% following a 32 bp rise which has broken the declining trend observed over the 
past decade (see Chart 2.16.A). This improvement in the tier 1 ratio was extensive to a 
large number of banks. In fact, very few banks have a tier 1 ratio below 6% (the required 
minimum is 4%) and their relative weight is very low (see Chart 2.16.B). Moreover, their 
number and their relative weight have diminished over the past year. Conversely, the rela-
tive weight of banks (over 100) with a ratio of over 8% (double the required minimum) has 
increased significantly.
The slowdown in Spanish deposit institutions’ lending during 2007, amid easing activity, has 
passed through to risk-weighted assets which, after posting growth of 21.3% at end-2006, 
showed a rate of 12.7% a year later. Thus, credit risk requirements have grown to 13.8%, 8.3 
pp less than a year earlier, as a result of the slowdown both in assets with a weighting of 50% 
(5.8 pp), mostly home mortgage loans, which grew by 8.8% in 2007, and in the riskiest assets 
(with a weighting of 100%) which have slowed by 9.1 pp with an increase of 15%. At the same 
time, credit with a zero rating (that to general government, among others) has increased by 
25.5% which, combined with the foregoing, has resulted in a slight improvement in deposit 
institutions’ risk profile (risk-weighted assets as a proportion of total assets) of 55 bp to 
66.8%.
The behaviour of total capital has been very similar to that of risk-weighted assets, as after 
several years’ stable growth (at around 22%) it posted a strong slowdown in December 2007 
(of 15 pp, having increased at a rate of 7.2%). The behaviour of its components was mixed. 
On one hand, on the positive side, tier 1 capital grew by 17.7%, entailing an acceleration of 
close to 6 pp, while tier 2 capital slowed for the second year running having grown at a rate of 
7.3%, compared with 33% in 2006. On the other hand, deductions rebounded (141%), mean-
ing that their contribution to the total solvency ratio was negative of the order of 7.2 pp.
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
Solvency remains 
comfortably above the 
minimum regulatory 
requirements, with tier 1 
capital having been 
strengthene.
Risk-weighted assets are 
slowing…
… as are own funds, where 
tier 1 capital is growing 
sharply.
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The notable growth in tier 1 capital can largely be explained (see Chart 2.17.A) by the sound 
performance of banking activity during 2007 which, converted into rising income, has al-
lowed banks to transfer a portion of their profits to reserves (these quickened by around 6 pp 
having grown by 18.6%). The strong dynamism of reserves has been partly offset by the in-
crease in goodwill. Tier 2 capital slowed significantly in step with the disappearance of the 
positive effects of the change in regulations on to the eligibility of general provisions and of 
revaluation reserves, which came about during 2005 and 2006. As a result, developments in 
tier 2 capital once again hinge, above all, on the change in subordinated financing which, 
moreover, is the most significant part of tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.17.B). Finally, deductions 
from own funds rose once again as a result of the increase in holdings in financial institu-
tions.
The solvency ratios are calculated taking into account risk-weighted assets. However, since 
last summer, there has been growing interest among analysts in the direct comparison of own 
funds to total assets, probably owing to the uncertainty over the level of risk of assets and to 
the greater interest aroused by the direct analysis of banks’ degree of leverage. Spanish de-
posit institutions show (see Chart 2.18.A) a ratio of regulatory capital to total non-weighted 
assets of over 7%, which has been relatively stable in recent years. A closer measure is ob-
tained by considering only capital and reserves (core capital), i.e. excluding tier 2 capital and 
the hybrid components of tier 1 capital (preference shares). Chart 2.18.A shows that the new 
ratio is close to 6%, which is a high level. In addition, an international comparison of the ratio 
of capital to reserves (net in this case of goodwill) shows the strength of the major Spanish 
banks (see Chart 2.18.B).15
The own funds/total assets 
ratio is also high…
… and the comparison with 
the major international 
banks shows the sound 
position of Spanish banks in 
terms of their core capital.
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Using CCR data, a model has been constructed to estimate the distribution of Spanish deposit 
institutions’ credit risk losses on the basis of historical data on loans granted by these institutions 
in the past two decades. By means of this model, an analysis has been conducted of the effect 
of macroeconomic variables such as GDP and interest rates on the proportion of defaults, the 
changes in the total number of loans granted and the loss that these defaults entail for banks. 
As a result, it has been possible to calculate the impact that different macroeconomic scenarios 
would have on the distribution of cumulative losses over a time horizon of three years. 
The distribution of losses shows a shift rightwards and a flattening (see Chart 2.19) from De-
cember 2006 to December 2007, which is indicative of greater expected and unexpected 
losses. The increase in the volume of credit extended between both dates explains the shift. 
However, the own funds available at present comfortably cover these losses. The expected 
loss amounts to only 45% of the sum of the general and specific provisions of all deposit insti-
tutions in December 2007, while the unexpected loss, calculated at a confidence level of 
99.9%, accounts for only 19% of the system’s own funds.
Stress tests using different 
adverse macroeconomic 
scenarios confirm the 
resilience of Spanish banks.
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In addition, a stress test has been performed on the distribution of losses obtained in 
2007. It analyses the impact that four consecutive quarters of GDP declines on a similar 
scale to those that occurred in the 1993 recession would have. It is further assumed that, 
as from the fourth quarter, it would take two years to regain the previous growth levels. As 
can be seen (Chart 2.19), the fundamental effect on the distribution of cumulative losses 
over the next three years would be a considerable increase in credit risk. Specifically, the 
expected loss would increase by 57%, while the unexpected loss, also evaluated at 
99.9%, might undergo a 44% increase on its current value. Despite the harshness of the 
simulated scenario, the own funds built up by Spanish deposit institutions would be capa-
ble of comfortably absorbing the increase in credit risk losses in the business in Spain. In 
particular, the expected loss in this stress test scenario would only amount to 70% of the 
sum of the general and specific provisions, while the unexpected loss would only be 26% 
of own funds.16
As mentioned in previous FSRs, one differential characteristic of the Spanish financial system 
is the high presence of banks. Nonetheless, the study of other financial intermediaries, such 
as insurance companies, is relevant to the analysis of financial stability. The effects stemming 
from the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and the current conditions in international financial 
markets pose additional challenges to the insurance industry. However, the information avail-
able to date, and the assessments by various national and international agencies, suggests 
that at present there are no particular tensions affecting the traditional sector of this busi-
ness.
This general assessment can be inferred from the fact that, at the international level, insurance 
companies have invested to only a limited extent in the type of structured products at the root 
of the problems besetting international financial markets. The exposures arising from risks re-
lated to the sub-prime segment, which some international studies estimate at between 2% 
2.2 Other financial 
market participants 
2.2.1 INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The direct risks arising from 
the sub-prime segment for 
insurance companies 
appear to be limited.
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and 10% of total assets in the sector, are considered manageable. So far insurance compa-
nies have not been affected by the liquidity risk derived from operations via conduits or SIVs. 
The information available on the Spanish insurance sector confirms the foregoing. Companies 
holding some marginal risk, whether direct or indirect, are limited in number and in terms of 
their relative weight in the sector. Further to various studies undertaken, the biggest Spanish 
insurance companies have declared that they have no exposures in mutual funds or in struc-
tured products that are exposed to the US sub-prime segment.
The data on the performance of Spanish insurance companies, available only to 2007 Q3, 
reveal the stability of the sector. To September 2007, insurance companies’ assets grew by 
6.2% on the same period of the previous year. The balance-sheet structure has not changed 
significantly in relation to previous periods, meaning that insurers hold a high proportion of their 
assets in fixed-income investments (50.5% in September 2007), most of which (around 60%) 
are classified as held-to-maturity investments. Equities account for a small proportion (5% of 
total assets), while unit-linked policies, in which the policyholder assumes the risk of the invest-
ment, account for 6% of assets. Accordingly, the fluctuations in securities markets are not 
factors of high risk for the Spanish insurance industry in view of its limited exposure. And nor 
is the trajectory of interest rates, insofar as positions are generally managed by means of dura-
tion immunisation.
The growth of the Spanish insurance sector can be seen in the 9.5% increase in premiums in 
2007 Q3. The life branch (15.1%) outpaced the non-life branch (5.8%), with premiums in the 
latter accounting for 58% of the total.
The solvency of the sector continues to be high. On one hand, the assets subject to technical 
provisions exceed the provisions to be covered, both in the life and non-life branches. On the 
The data available on 
Spanish insurance 
companies show their 
stability.
They have grown in terms of 
premiums…
… and have high solvency 
margins.
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other, the solvency margin is at a very high level, standing at 190% for life insurance and at 
347% for the non-life branch.
At the international level, one insurance business area in which concern is growing is that of the 
so-called monolines.17 These entities pursue a significantly different type of business from tradi-
tional insurance companies. They basically provide credit enhancements to bond issuers, which 
usually take the form of an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee of payment of the principal 
and interest of the bonds that are underwritten. In this way, the issues obtain a better credit rat-
ing than would have been assigned to them in the absence of the insurance. What is more, even 
if the issuer has a good credit rating, it may find it beneficial to engage the services of a monoline 
if its name is not widely known, since its securities become more attractive to investors.
Traditionally, monolines have underwritten issues in the US municipal bond market. But in re-
cent years, and despite the differences between the various companies in the sector, they 
have significantly increased their share in the structured products market, granting credit en-
hancements to the super-senior tranches of securitisations with CDOs, which in some cases 
had underlying assets of poor credit quality.
The pressures financial markets have experienced since last summer have impacted mono-
lines, which have posted losses in their mark-to-market positions in products such as syn-
thetic CDOs and other derivatives. This has been reflected both in their stock market prices 
(see Chart 2.20.A) and in CDS spreads.
Monolines normally maintain their positions to maturity and only have to meet the payments 
committed in the guarantees they offer in the event of the related bond defaulting. Nonethe-
less, to the extent that the losses in mark-to-market positions reflect the deterioration in the 
There is growing concern at 
present about monolines….
… which have granted 
credit enhancements to the 
super-senior tranches of 
CDOs.
The problems that have 
affected these products are 
jeopardising monoline 
ratings (normally AAA)...
17. This insurance business segment comprises a set of specialised institutions located in the United States, although 
some of them belong to European financial institutions. Concentration in the monoline market is high, since the joint 
market share of the six biggest companies is around 90%.
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credit quality of the securities, they entail an increase in the likelihood of the monolines having 
to meet future payments on the instruments underwritten. Against this background, the rating 
agencies have recently announced a revision of these companies’ ratings, a question which is 
fundamental to the type of business they pursue. 
The downgrading of monolines would have a significant effect on the ratings of the bonds they 
have underwritten. That might adversely affect credit markets, insofar as the downgrading of 
the securities guaranteed would prompt orders to sell by the investors holding such securities. 
Some international banks might also be directly affected, either because they are owners of or 
have capital stakes in monolines, or because they have taken out protection via CDSs to 
which these companies are a counterparty. 
Spanish deposit institutions, unlike other foreign banks, have no significant exposure to mono-
lines. Accordingly, there are no direct risks to the Spanish banking system. In any event, the 
risks associated with monolines would be indirect ones, insofar as their difficulties were to 
heighten the current turbulence besetting international financial markets.
In Spain, the direct exposure to US sub-prime mortgages of investment and pension funds is 
virtually nil. Nonetheless, the indirect risks stemming from the current conditions in financial 
markets pose sizeable management challenges to both types of entity.
Developments in financial markets, characterised by an increase in credit spreads, and by 
the downward and more volatile trend of stock markets, will have an impact on the sector. 
In this respect, the average weighted return in 2007 for investment funds was 2.40%, be-
low the return on public debt. The return on pension funds was, at 2.1%, also along these 
lines.
In a setting in which financial markets are performing unfavourably, savers are likely to modify 
their investment strategies, opting for products — such as bank deposits — that offer a lower 
risk profile. A further contributing factor here is the new tax arrangements for saving products 
(see Table 3.1 of the November 2007 FSR).
… which would affect the 
bonds underwritten, 
potentially prompting strong 
sales thereof.
Spanish credit institutions 
have no direct exposure to 
monolines.
2.2.2 OTHER FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES
Investment funds may be 
affected by the downward 
and more volatile trend of 
markets,…
…, by investors’ diminished 
appetite for risk and by greater 
competition from deposit 
institutions to capture savings.
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The data available so far corroborate the foregoing. The total assets of collective investment 
institutions (CIIs) declined during 2007 by more than €9 billion (–2.7%) to €327.96 billion. 
Among CIIs, capital market investment funds, which account for 72.8% of the total, saw their 
assets fall by 6.1%, while the decline in the number of shareholders was 6.3%. Net share 
subscriptions were clearly negative, especially in the second half of the year, and since then 
net redemptions of close to €26 billion have been recorded (see Chart 2.20.B).
The situation in the pension funds sector was somewhat better, although their performance in 
2007 was rather less dynamic than in previous years. Pension fund net assets increased in 
2007 by 6.52% to €86.56 billion, compared with growth of 11.5% in 2006.
As noted in previous FSRs, the November 2005 Regulation on CIIs opened up further possi-
bilities for the investment funds sector, allowing for the creation in Spain of hedge funds and of 
funds of funds. However, this sector is of limited relative significance in Spain, as is the expo-
sure of Spanish institutions to it. Internationally, however, hedge funds have significantly in-
creased the volume of assets they manage in recent years. There has been debate on several 
occasions about their capacity to diversify risks more efficiently and, at the same time, about 
their potential dangers as what are involved are highly leveraged structures. To date, however, 
they have not been at the root of the problems afflicting international financial markets, al-
though some have experienced difficulties. 
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3 Infrastructures
Despite the increasing difficulties in international financial markets since last summer (the sub-
prime crisis, lack of liquidity in conduits and SIVs, withdrawal of institutional investors from the 
securitisation market (covered bonds and ABSs) and LBO-related debt, loss of confidence 
among the large international banks and accumulation of liquidity for precautionary reasons, 
exposures to monolines and DPCs, worsening expectations, rising defaults and falling stock 
markets), the infrastructures supporting international financial markets (securities dealing, 
clearing and settlement and wholesale and retail payment systems) have operated without any 
significant problems. The current difficulties are therefore not related to market infrastructures 
but, in part, to the working and dynamics of such markets. In any event, given the intensity of 
the turbulence, there is a growing debate over how best to further improve other regulatory-
type infrastructures.
In the area of regulatory infrastructures, two central elements have recently been overhauled. 
Firstly, through the process known as Basel II (and its application in the European Union 
through the Capital Requirements Directive No. 2006/48 and the forthcoming Banco de Es-
paña Circular on capital)1 and, secondly, through the entry into force of the International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) (through EU Regulation No. 1606/2002 and Banco de Es-
paña Accounting Circular 4/2004). 
Basel II, which comes into force in Spain this year, represents an enormous advance in bank-
ing regulation by linking credit institutions’ capital requirements much more closely to the level 
of risk assumed. As a result, potential incentives for institutions to arbitrage capital standards 
owing to their limited risk sensitivity will be avoided. For example, until now the consumption 
of regulatory capital in business financing was independent of the level of the credit risk so that 
a loan to a company with the highest credit rating consumed the same percentage of capital 
as another to a company on the verge of default. Securitisation enabled institutions to exploit 
this lack of sensitivity of capital requirements to risk.
Transition to a system of capital requirements that are much more closely aligned with the 
level of risk amounts to a very significant improvement in the regulatory infrastructure. How-
ever, this transition is not free from certain potential difficulties, which must be taken into con-
sideration by the institutions, the most important of which is probably the question of procycli-
cality.2 In contrast to capital requirements that were constant over the business cycle under 
Basel I, capital requirements are now going to be more proportionate to the level of risk and 
the latter, measured in terms of the loan’s probability of default (PD), changes with the business 
cycle: PDs increase in downswings and decrease in upswings. Thus, in line with changes in 
PDs, a substantial increase in capital requirements may have an adverse impact on lending 
and, therefore, on economic activity, aggravating recessions.
At the same time, the new accounting standards (IFRSs) applied in the European Union and in 
other countries of the world since 2005, and the standards applied in the United States (FASB), 
also incorporate elements of sensitivity to the business cycle, such as the application of fair 
value, which may be understood as the price at which purchasers and vendors exchange a 
Despite the significant 
difficulties that have arisen 
in international financial 
markets …
…problems have not been 
detected in the 
infrastructures underpinning 
them.
However, debate is 
intensifying over how to 
further improve the 
regulatory infrastructures.
Basel II represents an 
enormous advance in risk 
management…
… although, given the 
greater sensitivity of the 
requirements to risk, it may 
increase the procyclicality of 
the banking system.
The application of fair value 
also incorporates elements 
of procyclicality.
1. The Banco de España published the text of this Circular on 29 February for public consultation. 2. A discussion can 
be found in the paper by E. González “Prociclicidad, volatilidad financiera y Basilea II” published in Estabilidad Financiera, 
No. 8, pp. 153-161.
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financial instrument. Fair value is applied in the valuation of financial instruments held in the 
trading book and of those available for sale, but not in the valuation of those held to maturity. 
The latter should be classified as held-to-maturity investments and are carried, both in Europe 
and in the United States, at amortised cost.
Financial markets, and the agents that participate in them, behave procyclically by their very 
nature. That is to say, during upturns they tend not to fully incorporate the risks that are ac-
cumulating, so as to react swiftly during downturns. Insofar as financial regulation has to reflect 
and be adapted to the reality of the markets, it also incorporates a certain element of procycli-
cality. This is the case, for example, of both Basel II and IFRSs. However, the important thing 
is to determine whether these regulations incorporate elements of procyclicality that are ad-
ditional to those characterising the financial system, or whether they are a reflection of the 
same, i.e. their application is neutral in terms of the procyclicality that they incorporate. Given 
the importance of this question, it should be analysed in greater depth.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was aware of the procyclicality question 
and introduced into the new regulatory framework, in both pillar 1 and pillar 2, elements that 
mitigate it (the possibility of calculating probabilities of default on the basis of a long time 
horizon,3 stress tests in the face of stagnation in economic activity, adjustment of capital re-
quirements to the cyclical profile, etc.). The most important element of mitigation is probably 
active management of capital by institutions, with a medium-term perspective and awareness 
of the impact that a change in the cycle has on capital requirements. In this respect, it should 
be noted that credit institutions operate in most cases with a significant margin of capital 
above the regulatory minimum.
Debate regarding the sensitivity of fair value to the cycle has, however, been more limited. That 
said, the growing difficulties in the international financial markets since last summer have inten-
sified interest in this question, since the procyclicality of fair value becomes more evident when 
there are no deep liquid markets (the fair value would be the market price if there were) and a 
mark-to-model approach must be used.
Liquidity in many markets has declined very significantly since last summer, so that institutions 
have increasingly had to resort to obtaining the value of their financial instruments through in-
formation contained in markets for similar instruments or by using their own models (marking 
to model) which, moreover, use inputs (probabilities of default, losses given default, default 
correlations between the different components of a portfolio, etc.) that are not directly observ-
able in the market.
US accounting standards (SFAS 157) classify assets (and liabilities) into three levels, depend-
ing on the way in which they are valued: level 1 assets, whose prices are observed directly on 
asset markets; level 2 assets, whose prices are obtained from markets that are not very active 
or, in the case of financial instruments, whose value depends on inputs that are directly or in-
directly observable on a market; and, finally, level 3 assets, which are valued by marking to a 
model that uses inputs not observable in any market. The information supplied by US invest-
ment banks shows that level 2 and level 3 assets have grown since last summer. For example, 
the level 3 assets of investment banks clearly exceed the volume of their regulatory capital, 
while their level 2 assets may be 10 times their level 3 assets. That is to say, an erroneous 
The financial system is 
procyclical by nature. The 
important question is to 
determine whether the 
regulation incorporates 
additional elements of 
procyclicality.
The BCBS has included 
various elements that 
mitigate this problem.
The debate over IFRSs has 
been more limited, although 
it has been intensified by the 
recent difficulties ...
... since the valuation 
problems associated with 
marking to model have been 
highlighted …
3. The paper by J. Saurina and C. Trucharte “An assessment of Basel II procyclicality in mortgage portfolios”, in the 
Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 32, No. 1-2, October (2007), pp. 81-1 shows the significant differences in 
regulatory capital obtained over the cycle depending on the method used to calculate the probability of default.
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valuation of these assets, as a result of their complexity or a lack of reliable information, may 
have very significant solvency repercussions.
A large part of the difficulties in valuing certain financial instruments stem from their growing 
complexity. The various securitisation tranches (from triple A to equity, the first tranche to as-
sume losses) are recombined and repackaged into new financial instruments (CDOs, for ex-
ample) to be resold to new investors. In order to value these successive instruments theoreti-
cal models are used which have been developed recently and have not been tested in a 
highly adverse scenario. The successive combinations of securitisation tranches and CDOs 
substantially alter the loss distribution so that it is much more difficult to calculate the level of 
risk incurred, which also increases with each successive securitisation. Many of these models 
did not take into account the fact that part of the underlying of these products was sub-prime 
loans with poorly measured behaviour that is highly sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates 
and house prices, and to borrowers’ incentives. Therefore default correlations in portfolios with 
sub-prime loans were significantly underestimated, largely because the credit extension mod-
el changed from buy-and-hold (the bank retained all or at least part of the credit risk) to origi-
nate-to-distribute (the bank swiftly transferred all the credit and, consequently, its incentives for 
monitoring borrower quality fell drastically).4
Many of the investors in the most senior tranches of securitisations were not in a position to 
assume and manage much higher risk levels than those indicated by these securities’ credit 
ratings. These instruments, which were generally recorded in the trading book, began to lose 
value at the same time as their rating was downgraded with the result that if they were used 
as collateral for other operations, investors had to increase such collateral and second, and 
most importantly, certain investors began to sell them once certain thresholds in the instru-
ment’s fair value were exceeded, thus putting further downward pressure on valuations and 
creating a vicious circle. These sales largely met the objective of limiting trading book losses.
Strong growth of these complex products, against a backdrop of low risk premiums and of 
investors seeking higher returns, together with their inclusion in the trading book (and, there-
fore) at fair value, had a very significant effect on the earnings of the institutions which used 
them. During upswings, investors obtain high returns (as do the product placers), increasing 
the incentives to expand this business. However, in the event of a drastic change in market 
sentiment, these instruments are rapidly repriced (also incorporating a premium for lower li-
quidity) triggering sizeable losses which, since the instruments are in the trading book, are 
immediately taken to institutions’ results. Certain investors may have hedged against the risks 
of loss of value of these instruments. However, the effectiveness of these hedges (through 
monolines and CDSs) may be in doubt if the volume hedged is very high and the fall in value 
very significant. The fact that sales of protection were made by just a few institutions only in-
creases the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of these hedges. Under these circum-
stances, the solvency of protection sellers may also be questioned. These sellers had the 
benefit, in the upswing, of the insurance premiums and practically no defaults, with a very fa-
vourable impact on their income.
In short, when markets disappear, it is necessary to resort to inputs and internal models that 
are, in turn, extremely procyclical (higher correlations between the value of assets in the port-
folio), which further contributes to aggravating problems in view of the reaction of investors 
and bank managers to limit losses. Accordingly, it has been argued that, if investors have no 
intention of trading these securities, i.e. they are going to hold them to maturity, then it would 
… especially for a group of 
very complex products held 
in the trading book.
In current financial market 
conditions, these problems 
have resulted in significant 
losses for certain 
international banks.
4. See Box 2.2.
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be appropriate to classify them as financial assets held to maturity and not in the trading book 
or as available-for-sale financial assets. Note that until last summer these comments were 
non-existent and that now, very probably, it is sought to delay the recognition of losses by re-
classifying assets held for trading as assets held to maturity, which is not permitted by IFRSs 
or US accounting standards.
The solution in this situation is not so much to reclassify financial instruments in the trading 
book in other portfolios as to start a debate as to whether it would be appropriate for IFRSs to 
recognise the uncertainties associated with the calculation of fair value under certain circum-
stances. In view of the complexity of the products, the uncertainty surrounding their valuation 
and the difficulty of predicting how liquidity and investors’ appetite for risk will develop in a 
changing environment, it would be desirable that when markets are booming, accounting 
standards permit the creation of objective and transparent reserves to reflect, for example, 
uncertainty about default correlations between instruments. Should the uncertainty become 
manifest, these reserves would be the first item to combat a decline in the value of these com-
plex instruments.
Application of the above proposal to financial instruments held for trading and available for sale 
would decrease excessive earnings volatility and, consequently, would also moderate the in-
centives for financial institutions’ managers to expand business excessively when markets are 
free from difficulties and to contract it excessively when markets disappear. Clearly, these 
valuation reserves for uncertainty would have to be completely transparent and reported to 
investors at all times to enable them to reconstruct the valuations, without the adjustment for 
reserves, if they so desire.
The procyclicality of IFRSs is also present in the measurement of losses incurred due to cred-
it risk in the corporate and household loan portfolio. Greater flexibility in the accounting stand-
ards for credit loss provisions (the calculation of asset impairment) would also enable this 
procyclicality to be reduced and would make accounting standards and changes in bank risk 
over the cycle more consistent.5
For all the above reasons, this seems to be a suitable moment to commence a debate on the 
need to make IFRSs more flexible when they apply basic principles of risk measurement and 
management and, in particular, on the appropriateness of earlier recognition of a highly likely 
future loss in asset value. In this way, bank managers could have greater incentives to limit 
their naturally procyclical behaviour.
The solution to these 
problems should not involve 
reclassifying instruments in 
the trading book in other 
portfolios…
… but rather an in-depth 
debate of the limitations of 
fair value in certain 
circumstances …
… and the possible 
appropriateness of creating 
objective and transparent 
valuation reserves to show 
the uncertainties 
surrounding certain 
parameters of valuation 
models …
… as well as a more flexible 
way of recognising losses 
incurred due to credit risk.
5. A discussion on how to do this is found in the paper by G. Jiménez and J. Saurina “Credit cycles, credit risk, and 
prudential regulation”, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2, No. 2, June 2006, pp. 65-98.
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